Did Caesar know what to do with his dictatorship?

Classics 2029: Ro adult male republi domiciliate record Did Caesar know what to do with his authoritarianship? Introduction Julius Caesar, one of the just about alpha diachronic figures in papist history, remains to this day something of an enigma. Historians and different scholars get up described him in widely divergent price ranging from tyrant to democrat and from agency to populist. This essay seeks to answer the interrogative did Caesar know what to do with his dictatorship? It does so by examining the afterwards long time of Caesars extraordinary life, concentrating on the m of his dictatorship, particularly from 47 B.C. until his death on the Ides of March, 44 B.C. The essay explores the raft of re divisions introduced by Caesar during his dictatorship, changes which effectively brought Re universean capital of Italy to an abrupt shutting. It analyses Caesars plans, goals and ambitions for Rome during this period, including the contestation o er his kingship, and investigates the worrys and issues that ended in his assassination by a clique of jealous senatorial associates. While it is obviously out(predicate) to delimit Caesars definitive plans, it is difficult to argue with Yavetz conclusion that it is manifestly go done that Caesar, by the period of his death, was king in either that ingest (Yavetz, 1983, 17). Political Reforms Kamm has argued that Caesar was non the kind of reformer who carried others along with him, it was not a plate of we can do it to a greater extent(prenominal) effectively so much as I can do it more effectively (Kamm, 2006, 145). This centrality of Caesar is best exemplified in his major reform, the introduction of a saucily constitution for Rome. In pr d stalli providedyice, he re piddled a constitution build around a fortify leader, consciously or subconsciously moulding a arranging which required one man to be in over e very control. His semi semipolitical goals du ring this process were to beat out all arme! d resistance in the provinces, to become a fortified central governance in Rome, and to knit unneurotic the entire empire into a single cohesive unit. The low power train goal was accomplished when Caesar defeated Pompey and his supporters. To accomplish the other 2 goals, however, he needed to ensure that his control over the authorities was undisputed. This was achieved in two ways. First, he increased his own dominance by assuming several important magistracies. This allowed him to initiate really valid legislation on matters much(prenominal) as debt, lemon supply, province settlements and provincial regime and enfranchisement. By the time of his death, Caesar had held innumerous political offices and decision-making positions. Second, he reduce the authority of Romes other political institutions by introducing several additional political changes including making the senates membership more broadly representative than of Rome and Italy entirely. The outcome of all of these developments was that the popular assemblies were well on their way to becoming ciphers, Caesars widespread put up of equestrians, plebs and armies saw to this (Shotter, 1994, 82). Several scholars support the need for much(prenominal) actions. For example, Mommsen argues that papist society was out of control and close to destruction, it was Caesar alone who started to extend control of its history and directed it towards becoming a public presentation Empire, envisaging himself as Emperor (Mommsen, 1973, 12). Problems point though Caesar had ostensibly outside the drop dead of his rivals when he defeated Pompey and Cato, there were enzootic challenges and fusss he had to whip to institute his desired political reforms. condescension crushing his enemies in the Civil War, flaking to restore stability to the roman print raise turn up difficult. Arguably, Caesars most important problem was that he became too powerful: the Roman country was an oligarchy in which the powers were shared among th! e senators. Even though the Senate was defeated, oligarchic sentiments were strong, and Caesar had to find a way to make his regularise tolerable (Byrd, 2001, 142). Baldson concurs, suggesting that the reconstruction of government was in fact the largest problem which Caesar faced, and it was one which he seems to realise make no attempt to solve (Baldson, 1967, 71). Rather Caesar seemed to always evade the issue by leaving Rome and starting yet another raw military campaign. An alternative move up was to playact as a king, without authenticly using this title. Roman covert in(p) law allowed one way to exercise personal accession pattern: dictatorship. Caesar was do dictator after his return from Ilerda; in October 48 B.C. he was again appointed, in 46 B.C. he became dictator for ten years and in 44 B.C. for life. This was, however, not a solution, since the dictatorship had already been mis utilize by sulla, as discussed below. A permanent consulship seemed to be a better receipt to the situation, and then Caesar had himself elected consul throughout the 40s. He also experimented with Pompeys innovation, the consulship without colleague (45 BC). Again, this didnt snuff it: although repeated consulships were not unconstitutional, occupying diverse delineate positions permanently, such as a magistrature, made it im contingent for the aristocrats to fulfil their usanceal roles and their ambitions. As Bradford notes they (senators) were with pride of rank and position, more than unwilling to become innocent officials in the dictators bureaucracy. In the appointment of consuls and other officials who were merely executors of his design, Caesar had take away all hope and ambition from the whole ruling capable up of Romans (Bradford, 1984, 216). Throughout his dictatorship, Caesar failed to incorporate the senate into his governance plans- a key divisor in his death. Comparing dictators- Sulla/Caesar Sulla offers the only historical antecedent to Caesars dictatorship. These two dictat! ors marched on Rome for very different reasons and for very different ends. some(prenominal) the fine motives for Caesars usurpation of power a broad justification for it whitethorn be lay down in the history of the Republic since the time of Sulla (Gelzer, 1968, 42). Caesar initially set himself to mend rather than to end the Republic. Subsequently, it was the failure of his attempt at reconstruction which gave Caesar reason to forecast that the Republic mogul be past mending (Cary and Scullard, 1975, 282). Caesar made a popular point of emphasising that he was seeking to act in a manner that was the precise opposite of that which Sulla had embodied; specifically, he encouraged clemency over banishment and progressive over regressive reform. Caesar, from his lonely height of power, was endlessly willing to exculpate previous lapses by his appointees or even off the right-down hostility of his opponents, but he was perhaps unable to realize that those to whom this almost regal pardon was extended some time felt, like Cato, that he had no right to bestow (Ehrenberg, 1964, 156). Suetonius has employ Caesars own denominations to describe Sulla as an uninformed in politics, and the res publica as a mere name without substance. Caesar, present to Suetonius, regarded Sulla as a fool for resigning his office (Suetonius, 1913, 84-87) therefrom leaving the restored res publica under the senates weak leadership and at the clemency of political generals such as Pompey. Caesar, in contrast, became dictator in perpetuum in 44 B.C. thus bring pour down the very nature of the dictatura, the time limit which was the Republican apology against one mans supreme power. Dictator Perpetus, a new concept and one incompatible with the Republican constitution, in essentials marrowed to the same as rex, but avoided this hated word (Fuller, 1965, 87). At the same turn when Caesar brought an ancient Roman tradition of extraordinary office to a culmination, its very nature as an office was destroyed. In a differen! t sense he proved again that he was not a punt Sulla, not illiterate in politics and not touch on with maintaining the empty form of the res publica. Plans Having reviewed Caesars reforms and the challenges posed by these reforms, we now explore his plans for the future. Was he a tyrant or reformer, brilliant leader or the last destroyer of the Republic? And what were his plans for his dictatorship? Did he offer to create a monarchy or did he actually pretend any plans for the future? These difficult questions have been argued for centuries and will neer be satisfactorily resolved. Plutarch, however, was in no doubt of the answers: what made Caesar most openly and mortally hated was his passion to be king (Plutarch, 1972, 48). Others, such as Kalyvas, are more discreet; he contends that there are no real clues as to Caesars actual state of mind upon the Republic and his own labyrinthine kinship with it (Kalyvas, 2007, 430). These latter arguments carry weight. Rome wa s leaving through a major political change. A strong case can be made that the crewalism, corruption, and constitutional gridlock of the posthumous Republic was the product of a city­state government existence stretched to cover a Mediterranean-wide empire, an empire extended to Britain and the Rhine river by Julius Caesar himself. Caesar has a lot been accused of making his transition from Republic to a practical(prenominal) monarchy too abruptly. In short, he was throwing old institutions on the scrap-heap originally he had provided efficient substitutes. A monarchy may have thus been in his mind as a solution. Equally, it can be argued that perhaps even Caesar himself did not know what his long-term intentions were, and that he was deferring any definite decisions while he focussed on solving short-term problems like maintaining economic stability, addressing the various brotherly problems afflicting Roman society, and conquering Parthia. Canfora has argued that there is an equal amount of breathed evidence to support a! ll of these assertions noting that Caesar did not hightail it up plans far in advance, preferring to exploit opportunities as they arose (Canfora, 2007, 93). Conclusion In all, Caesar only spent 17 months in Rome during the years 49­44 B.C. Whatever long-range plans he may have had, he had small-minded time to carry them out. Even so, two major but contradictory conclusions stand out. First, Caesar was control of the Roman world and he planned to exercise his victory openly.

This would indicate that Plutarch was correct in asserting that Caesar wanted to be king. Second, however, Caesar clearly took his posi tion as leader of the progressive faction seriously. He expanded Roman citizenship, introduced a host of sensible reform and generally reduced the exploitation of all Roman subjects. Carsons analysis seems appropriate: the virtue would seem to be that Caesar had, at the time of his death, devised no blueprint to secure the future political stability of the Roman state (Carson, 1957, 53). Another generation of courteous war was required to destroy senatorial opposition and create the circumstances which were to make possible the compromise solution devised by Augustus. Bibliography Primary Sources Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, translated by Rex Warner, capital of the United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1972. Suetonius, liveness of the Deified Julius, translated by J.C. Rolfe, London: William Heinemann, 1913. Secondary Sources Balsdon, J.P.V.D., Julius Caesar and Rome, London: The English Universities compact Limited, 1967. Bradfo rd, Ernle, Julius Caesar: The sideline of power, Lond! on : H. Hamilton, 1984. Byrd, Robert C., The senate of the Roman Republic; Addresses on the chronicle of Roman Constitutionalism, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. Canfora, L., Life and times of the peoples dictator, translated by Marian Hill and Kevin Windle, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007 Carson, R. A. G., Caesar and the Monarchy, Greece & Rome, Second Series, 4, 1, 1957, pp. 46-53. Cary, M. and Scullard, H.H., A history of Rome down to the reign of Constantine, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1975. Ehrenberg, Victor, Caesars last(a) Aims, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 68, 1964, pp. 149-161. Fuller, J.F.C., Julius Caesar: Man, soldier, and tyrant, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965. Gelzer, Matthias, Caesar: politico and statesman, translated by turncock Needham, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968. Kalyvas, Andreas, The shogunate of dictatorship: When the Greek tyrant met the Roman dictator, Political Theory, 35, 4, 20 07, pp. 412-442. Kamm, Antony, Julius Caesar: A life, New York: Routledge, 2006. Mommsen, Theodor, The history of Rome, translated by William P. Dickson, New York: Scribner, 1973. Shotter, David, The fall of the Roman Republic, New York: Routledge, 1994. Yavetz, Zwi, Julius Caesar and his public image, London: Thames and Hudson, 1983. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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